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The fact that crossing a political border dramatically reduces trade °ows has been
widely documented in the literature. The increasing number of borders has surprisingly
attracted much less attention. The number of independent countries has indeed risen
from 72 in 1948 to 192 today. This paper estimates the e®ect of political disintegration
since World War II on the measured growth in world trade. We ¯rst show that trade
statistics should be considered carefully when assessing globalization over time, since
the de¯nition of trade partners varies over time. We document a sizeable resulting
accounting artefact, which accounts for 17% of the growth in world trade since 1948.
Second, we estimate that political disintegration alone since World War II has raised
measured international trade °ows by 9% but decreased actual trade °ows (including
inter-regional trade) by 4%.
JEL classi¯cation: F1, N70.
Keywords: Trade, Borders, Political disintegration, Trade statistics.
R¶ esum¶ e
De nombreux articles r¶ ecents montrent que le passage d'une frontiµ ere politique
r¶ eduit fortement les¶ echanges. L'augmentation du nombre de frontiµ eres et ses cons¶ equences
pour le commerce international n'ont pas fait l'objet de la m^ eme d'attention dans la
litt¶ erature. Le nombre d'¶ Etats souverains a pourtant augment¶ e de 72 en 1948 µ a 192
aujourd'hui. Cet article estime l'e®et de la d¶ esint¶ egration politique sur la mesure de
la croissance du commerce mondial depuis la seconde guerre mondiale. Notre analyse
souligne d'abord que les statistiques commerciales doivent ^ etre trait¶ ees avec prudence
lorsque l'on mesure l'¶ evolution du degr¶ e de mondialisation, car la d¶ e¯nition des parte-
naires commerciaux varie dans le temps. Il en r¶ esulte un biais statistique important,
qui explique 17% de la croissance du commerce international depuis 1948. Nous mon-
trons ensuite que l'augmentation du nombre d'¶ Etats souverains seule a entrain¶ e une
augmentation du commerce international mesur¶ e de 9%, mais a en r¶ ealit¶ e diminu¶ e les
¶ echanges (incluant le commerce interr¶ egional) de 4%.
Code JEL: F1, N70.
Mots cl¶ es: Commerce international, Frontiµ eres, D¶ esint¶ egration politique, Statistiques com-
merciales.
2I Introduction
International trade has grown almost twice as fast as world income since World War II,
leading to an increase in the trade to GDP ratio from 24% in 1960 to 48% in 2003. The
causes of economic globalization remain surprisingly disputed (Krugman, 1995). The usual
suspects put forward in the literature are decreasing transport costs and the removal of
tari®s and non-tari® barriers to trade. Hummels (2007) nevertheless ¯nds little systematic
evidence documenting the decline in transport costs. He shows that, whereas air shipping
experienced a sharp cost reduction between 1955 and 2004, ocean shipping, which accounts
for 99% of world trade by weight, did not register such a decline.1
These explanations relate to the dissolution of national borders, either because of
technological progress in transport and communication or of the worldwide implementation
of free trade policies. A third explanation relates to the drawing of political borders. As
stated by Krugman (1995, p.340), \if international trade only includes shipments that cross
the borders, it is clear that the volume of trade depends quite a lot on where one draws
the line". In this respect, an outstanding feature of the past ¯ve decades is the increasing
number of sovereign nations. The number of countries has indeed increased from 72 in
1948 to 192 today, thanks in particular to the decolonization process and the break-up
of the Soviet Union. Figure 1 clearly suggests that the number of independent countries
and global trade openness measured by export plus imports over GDP are correlated.2
The aim of this paper is to investigate how and to what extent political disintegration has
a®ected the volume and geography of world trade since World War II.
The break-up of nations a®ects international trade through three channels. On the
one hand, former intra-national trade °ows become international trade °ows. Since these
shipments existed before independence, recording them as international °ows creates an
accounting artefact in the measurement of international trade over time. Moreover, pairs
of countries ever in a colonial relationship or former members of the same country share
linkages and economic, cultural and institutional characteristics that make them trade
more than average pairs of countries (Rose, 2000; de Sousa and Lamotte, 2007; Head et al.,
2007). On the other hand, the creation of political borders change relative trade costs. It
creates impediments to trade - tari®s as well as non-tari®s barriers to international °ows
such as independent currencies or di®erent standards and competition policies (Anderson
and van Wincoop, 2004) - that dramatically reduce international trade in comparison to
1Hummels et al. (2001) nevertheless show than small decreases in trade costs can lead to large increases
in the volume of trade by fostering vertical specialization.
2Alesina et al. (2000) argue that trade liberalization leads to political disintegration because being able
to trade easily with the rest of the world decreases the advantage of having a large domestic market. They
link political disintegration to the level of world trade freeness, while our paper links political disintegration
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intra-national trade (McCallum, 1995; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). Finally, since
bilateral trade °ows depend on relative trade costs (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003),
creating border barriers with some partners should increase trade with other partners.
For instance, the Czech Republic would be expected to trade less with Slovakia after the
break-up of Czechoslovakia, but more with any third country.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. We ¯rst provide an assessment of the
growth in international trade since World War II due to the variation over time in the
sample of countries recorded in the international statistics. We show that this accounting
artefact is sizeable and accounts for one sixth in the growth of measured international trade
since World War II. Part of the accounting artefact comes from the fact that the trade
°ows of some former colonies were not recorded at all in international statistics (neither
independently nor as part of their colonizer's trade) up to their independence. Second, we
investigate the impact of the creation of new political borders alone on the volume and
geography of world trade since World War II. Based on a theoretically motivated gravity
model of trade, we estimate world trade °ows in 2005 and in a counterfactual world in
2005 with 1945 borders. We show that newly independent states trade less with former
members of the same country (or their former colonizer) but trade more with the rest of
the world. Overall, our empirical results suggest that political disintegration has increased
measured international trade °ows by 9% but decreased actual (including inter-regional)
2trade °ows by 4%. Third, we show that the distribution of GDP abroad a®ects a country's
trade to GDP ratio; a country's trade openness increases when GDP abroad is distributed
among a larger number of trade partners.
Several papers investigate the causes of the growth in world trade as a share of GDP.
Estevadeordal et al. (2003) study the causes of the rise and fall of the trade to output ratio
during the 1870-1939 period. They show that the driving forces of trade globalization
were a fall in transport costs and the rise of the gold standard. Rose (1991) and Baier
and Bergstrand (2001) focus on the second wave of globalization after World War II. They
both work on a sample of OECD countries. Baier and Bergstrand (2001) show that two
thirds of the growth in trade between the late 1960s and the late 1980s can be explained
by income growth, 25% by a reduction in tari®s and 8% by a decline in transport costs.3
All these papers investigate the determinants of international trade growth on a subset of
countries, i.e. they investigate the intensive margin of the growth in international trade.
They cannot address the e®ect of the change in underlying features of the data such as the
distribution of GDP among an increasing number of potential trading partners, i.e. the
extensive margin of the growth in international trade. Yet world trade has increased by
a factor of 30 between 1948 and 2007, while over the same period trade between OECD
countries4 has increased by a factor of only 20. At the same time, the international trading
system has expanded from 72£71=2 = 2556 potential bilateral trade relationships in 1948
to 192 £ 191=2 = 18336 today. Assessing the contribution of this extensive margin to the
growth in international trade requires a structural estimation of a theoretically motivated
gravity model.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides evidence and estimates of
the accounting artefact related to variations over time in countries reported in interna-
tional trade statistics. The third section presents a theoretically based gravity framework
allowing the estimation of the impact of border changes on the geography and volume of
world trade °ows. Section 4 reports the estimation results.
II An assessment of the accounting artefact
The assessment of globalization through measured world trade depends crucially on the







3Jacks et al. (2009) con¯rm the prevalence of decreasing trade costs during the ¯rst wave of globalization
and of income growth during the second.
4We exclude members that joined OECD after 1990.
3where MW denotes world imports and Mij imports of i from j. Aggregate international
trade depends on the set of declaring exporters and importers N. In this section, we
estimate how variations over time in the sample of trade partners a®ect measured trade
growth since World War II.
We use the declared imports in the Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database of
the International Monetary Fund, which provides data on bilateral merchandise trade over
the period 1948-2007. The DOTS database is the main source of international trade data
available over a long time span.
1 Independent states and trade partners in the DOTS
The DOTS database reports trade °ows between \entities" that are not necessarily in-
dependent countries as de¯ned by international law and practice. As put forward by
Russett et al. (1968) and Small and Singer (1982, p38-46), in order to be registered as
a state member of the international system, \the entity must be a member of the United
Nations or League of Nations, or have population greater than 500,000 and receive diplo-
matic missions from two major powers".5 Trade partners in the DOTS database include
some territorial entities that are not independent states, and some independent states are
not considered as trade partners.
Figure 2 illustrates the discrepancy between the number of independent states and the
number of trade partners in the DOTS. For instance, in 2000, 191 states were recognized as
sovereign nations, while 195 trade origins (i.e. entities reporting imports) were recorded in
the DOTS. This discrepancy is due to the fact that some independent countries (Taiwan,
Monaco, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland6) were not
taken into account whereas some territorial entities, that were not sovereign states, were.7
In addition, Figure 2 underlines that the DOTS matrix is not squared, since the number
of declared trade partners varies by trade origin and increases over time.
From 1948 to 2007, 120 countries became independent but only 102 new trade origins
were created (Figure 2). Three quarters of these new trade origins re°ect the creation
of a new sovereign state, through the decolonization process (53%) and the break-up of
nations (21%). The remaining 26% are related to the recognition of existing countries in
1948, such as Mongolia or Afghanistan, and territories that are still not sovereign, like the
overseas territories of France, United Kingdom or the Kingdom of the Netherlands.8 The
5"State System Membership List Codebook", Version 2004.1 http://www.correlatesofwar.org/
6The DOTS does not consider Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland as trade origins but rather
the South African Common Customs Area (SACCA) excluding South Africa.
7Aruba, Bermuda, Hong Kong, Macao, Faeroe Islands, the Falkland Islands, French Polynesia, Green-
land, the Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia and St Pierre et Miquelon.
8The statistical territory of a country may change over time. For instance, from 1960 to 1996, the
4Figure 2: Sovereign states, trade origins and trade partners
size of the DOTS matrix has accordingly been multiplied by more than two.
The size of the DOTS matrix therefore depends to a large extent on changes in political
borders over time. New independent countries, however, did not necessarily enter the
DOTS in the years following their independence. Some colonies were already taken into
account in the DOTS in 1948 (see Table 1). Subsequently, in half of the cases, a new
independent country was recorded as a trade origin before its independence.
Table 1: Entities reporting to the DOTS in 1948 although they were not independent
Algeria 1962 (FR) Kenya 1963 (UK) Sierra Leone 1961 (UK)
Angola 1975 (PR) Laos 1949 (FR) Sudan 1956 (UK, Egypt)
Cambodia 1953 (FR) Madagascar 1960 (FR) Suriname 1975 (Nth)
Cameroon 1960 (FR-UN) Malaysia 1957 (UK) Trinidad & Tobago 1962 (UK)
Congo, D. R. 1960 (Bel) Malta 1964 (UK) Tunisia 1956 (FR)
Cyprus 1960 (UK) Mauritius 1968 (UK) Uganda 1962 (UK)
Ghana 1957 (UK) Morocco 1956 (FR) Vietnam 1953 (FR)
Guyana 1966 (UK) Mozambique 1975 (PR) Zambia 1964 (UK)
Jamaica 1962 (UK) Nigeria 1960 (UK) Zimbabwe 1980 (UK)
Notes: Colonizer in parenthesis. Date of independence are taken from
Correlates of War Project. 2005. \State System Membership List,
v2004.1"
Since 1948, the number of e®ective (positive) bilateral trade °ows has been continuously
growing and has increased more than six-fold over the period. New trade °ows (i.e.
involving a new trade origin and/or partner) represent an increasing share of bilateral
¯ve French overseas departments (Guadeloupe, Guyana, Martinique, Reunion and French Guiana) were
considered as distinct trade origins even if they were (and still are) part of France. On the contrary,
Belgium and Luxembourg were recorded as a single trade partner from 1948 to 1996.
5trade °ows, from 4% in 1950 to 55% in 2007 (see Figure 3 and Table 2).9 In comparison,
the share of trade °ows between countries that used to belong to the same statistical entity
made up 1% of world trade transactions in 2007 (see table 2). The value of trade °ows
involving new entities has also increased dramatically, to stand at 28% in the 2007.
Table 2: Number and value of world trade °ows by decade
Nbr of positive °ows Value of trade °ows
Total New Former inter- Total New Former inter-
regional °ows regional °ows
1948 3003 0 0 55218.61 0 0
1950 2900 116 0 50578.26 418.80 0
1960 4692 435 0 112086.70 2807.52 0
1970 8336 2072 0 293407.60 12778.69 0
1980 10133 2907 2 1856672.00 146440.30 110.8
1990 13402 4394 2 3345372.00 313067.50 108.2198
2000 20130 10636 220 6205497.00 1228920.00 48701.5
2007 21566 11783 226 13500000.00 3834935.00 161052.6
Notes: Authors' calculations on the basis of DOTS.
Figure 3: Number of trade °ows from 1948 to 2007
9Felbermayr and Kohler (2006) show that the share of positive trade °ows in the total number of °ows
has remained fairly constant over time and distinguish the contribution of new °ows between existing trade
origin in 1948 and °ows involving a new trade origin.
62 Estimating the accounting artefact
Whatever its cause, the creation of a new trade origin or trade partner in the DOTS
automatically increases the world trade matrix and thus international trade. Two cases
should nevertheless be distinguished regarding the statistical artefact which is generated
on the measurement of international trade.
In the general case of a country break-up, former inter-regional trade °ows become
international °ows because former regions of the same country become sovereign nations.10
For instance, the break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1993 resulted in the creation of two new
countries: the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Czechoslovakian trade, however, included the
trade of all its regions with the rest of the world. In this case, we thus de¯ne trade °ows
between the Czech Republic and Slovakia (i.e. USD 4882 millions in 1993) as a statistical
artefact since they existed before independence but were not recorded in the DOTS.
A country's independence may nevertheless have more severe consequences on the
measurement of international trade. The trade of some independent states, territories
or colonies was simply not recorded at all in international trade statistics before their
independence or their creation as a trade origin. In this case, all trade °ows of these
countries contribute to the accounting artefact since they existed but were not recorded
in 1948 and appeared in international statistics between 1948 and 2007. To illustrate the
relevance of this second source of accounting artefact, let's consider the case of the former
French West and Equatorial African colonies, whose trade °ows were simply not included
in the DOTS database even as part of the French imports or exports.11 Table 3 shows that
in 1962 these countries represented 4.25% of French foreign trade and that, from 1959 to
1962, their independence and creation as a trade origin accounted for 13.4% of the increase
in French trade. In addition, although they represented less than one percent of world
trade in 1962, their creation accounted for almost 4% of the increase in the value of world
trade °ows between 1959 and 1962.
The accounting artefact is sizeable also at the world level. In order to assess the bias
introduced in world trade statistics by the creation of new trade origins and trade partners,
we compute the share of the growth in world trade due to °ows that were not recorded
as international trade °ows in 1948. More precisely, we subtract from the total value of
imports recorded in the DOTS since 1948 the total value of trade between country pairs
10As mentioned previously trade origins in the DOTS are not necessarily independent states, and their
de¯nition has changed over time. Such changes are not neutral in term of measured international trade.
For instance, from 1948 to 1996 Belgium and Luxembourg were considered as a single trade partner. In
1997, these two countries were for the ¯rst time considered as distinct trade partners, and their bilateral
trade recorded in the DOTS.
11The French Customs and Excise Department (1959) de¯nes the French statistical territory as conti-
nental France (including the free zones of pays de Gex and Haute-Savoie), Corsica, Monaco and Sarre.
7Table 3: Impact on French and world trade of the independence of French Western and
Equatorial Africa (1959-1962)
% of the value % of French trade % of the value % of world trade
of French trade 1962 increase (1959-1962) of world trade 1962 increase(1959-1962)
Benin 0,16 0,49 0,03 0,12
Burkina Faso 0,09 0,29 0,03 0,16
Central African Rep.. 0,08 0,25 0,00 0,00
Chad 0,12 0,39 0,04 0,17
Congo, rep. of 0,28 0,90 0,04 0,38
C^ ote d'Ivoire 1,26 3,99 0,28 1,28
Gabon 0,37 1,17 0,08 0,36
Mali 0,10 0,30 0,01 0,04
Mauritania 0,19 0,60 0,03 0,14
Niger 0,14 0,43 0,03 0,15
Senegal 1,46 4,59 0,22 1,02
Total 4,25 13,39 0,83 3,81
Notes: Authors' calculations on the basis of DOTS.
that were not recorded in the DOTS trade matrix in 1948. Our de¯nition includes country
pairs that used to belong to the same country (e.g. Czech Republic and Slovakia) and
country pairs that were not recorded in 1948 either because the importer was not recorded
as a trade origin in the DOTS in 1948 (e.g. Afghanistan, Mali) or because the exporter was
not declared as a trade partner by a particular trade origin. Note that our de¯nition of the
accounting artefact is restrictive since we consider as existing all country pairs recorded
in the DOTS in 1948, including those for which a zero or missing value is reported in
1948 (79% of observations).12 Accordingly, our quanti¯cation of the accounting artefact
excludes the `real' extensive margin, i.e. zero trade °ows between existing country pairs
in 1948 that subsequently turned positive.
Results in Table 4 con¯rm that the accounting artefact is sizeable: it accounts for more
than one sixth of the growth in world trade since World War II. The accounting artefact
was particularly signi¯cant in the 1950s and 1960s due to the decolonization process and in
the 1990s due to the break-up of the Soviet Union.13 Overall, 17% of world trade growth
since 1948 is related to the inclusion of new trade origins in the DOTS database.
This section shows that variations over time in the number and de¯nition of trade
origins and partners in international trade statistics in°ate the measured growth in inter-
national trade. As underlined above, the creation of a new trade origin does not necessarily
re°ect the recognition of a new sovereign state. Moreover, changing political borders may
12Gleditch (2002) argues that many zeros in the DOTS are problematic and should be treated as missing
observations.
13Note that the German reuni¯cation has had no e®ect on the accounting artefact since trade °ows
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic was null before reuni¯-
cation.
8Table 4: Assessing the accounting artefact
Value of trade °ows Arti¯cial trade creation
(millions of constant USD) (share of total trade growth)
total artefact cumulative by decade
1948 229123 0
1959 334141 8334 7.9 7.9
1960 378671 9459
1969 690125 30266 6.6 3.2
1970 756205 32844
1979 2095359 162439 8.7 0.9
1980 2253243 174605
1989 2381311 235550 10.9 2.0
1990 2559581 236689
1999 3308888 335612 10.9 9.5
2000 3603657 395374
2007 6510982 1083380 17.2 0.3
Notes: Authors' calculations on the basis of DOTS. The last
column reports the statistical artefact related to new trade
origins/partners created during the decade only.
a®ect trade with third countries. Fully quantifying the contribution of changing political
borders on the growth in world trade therefore requires to go beyond simple descriptive
statistics and to structurally estimate a trade model. In the next section, we investigate
the impact of changing political borders on the volume and geography of world trade based
on a micro-founded gravity model of trade µ a la Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
III The gravity model and borders
The gravity model of trade is based on two building blocks (Anderson and van Wincoop,
2003). Consider ¯rst N countries/regions each specialized in the production of one good
di®erentiated by place of origin. We assume the supply of each good to be ¯xed. Let then







where cij is consumption of goods produced in country i by consumer of country j and
¾ is the elasticity of substitution between all goods. Country j's consumers maximise (2)
subject to the budget constraint:
X
i2N
pijcij = yj (3)
where pij is the price of goods produced in country i for country j's consumers and yj is
country j's nominal income.
9Let tij be the variable trade costs on exports from i to j. Then pij = pitij where pi is
country i's supply price. The value of exports from country i to country j is xij = pijcij
and total income of country i is yi =
P
j2N xij.




























Following Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), using (6) to solve for the unknown prices



































1 World openness under free trade
Under free trade, i.e. without transport costs or tari®s so that prices are identical for all
countries, bilateral trade is determined by the product of the two countries' GDPs. The
analysis of world trade is then straightforward: global trade openness depends only on
the size distribution of countries. Since prices are identical for all countries, we normalize





In this framework, Helpman (1987) shows that, for a group of countries A, the fraction











where TA is the volume of intra-regional trade, YA is the regional GDP, sA is the share
of region A in world GDP and siA are the share of region A's GDP of each country i in











where TW is the volume of world trade, N is the total number of countries in the world
and si is i's share of world GDP. The last term on the right hand side of (12) is a \size
dispersion index". The latter is minimized for N identical countries whose share of world
GDP is 1
N. Hence, under free trade, the relationship between global trade openness and
the number of independent countries is straightforward: an increase in the number of
countries increases the share of world production traded internationally by decreasing the
\size dispersion index".
Figure 4 plots the evolution between 1950 and 2002 of the sum of the squared share of
world GDP of independent countries and the US share of world GDP. It con¯rms that the
size dispersion index has been declining since World War II, thanks in particular to the
sharp decline of the US share of global GDP. The world with which the US were trading
in 1950 was with an outside world slightly larger than itself but is now ¯ve times larger.
2 Gravity with trade barriers
With transport costs, the analysis is less straightforward since bilateral trade depends on
relative trade costs (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). Any change in bilateral trade
costs between two countries therefore a®ects the trade °ows of each country with its other
partners. A country break-up creates border barriers between former regions of the same
country. This has two e®ects on international trade. First, it reduces actual trade °ows
between the two new independent countries but increases recorded international trade °ows
since trade between regions is not recorded as international trade before independence.
Second, it increases the average trade barriers that new countries face with all their trading
partners. A new independent country should thus trade less with the former regions of
the same country but trade more with other partners.
As underlined by Feenstra (2004) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), equation (7)





































































1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
sum of squarred GDP shares US share of world GDP
Source: Penn World Table 6.2
can be properly estimated using country ¯xed e®ects that account for inward and outward
multilateral resistance terms ¦i and Pj. We can therefore consistently estimate the e®ect
of national independence on trade between two former members of the same country from
(7). However, to assess the e®ect of country break-ups on trade with other partners, we
need to compute the multilateral resistance terms from (8) and (9).










We assume the following trade cost function:




The vector of observable bilateral linkages a®ecting trade costs includes variables measur-
ing geographical, cultural and historical proximity as well as trade policy variables:
Zij = [Contigij;Langij;Smctryij;Colonyij;ComColij;Comcurij;RTAijWTOij] (15)
where Contigij, Langij and Comcurij are dummies for countries sharing a common bor-
der, a common o±cial language and a common currency respectively. RTAij and WTOij
12measure common membership of a regional trade agreement and the World Trade Orga-
nization, and Smctryij, Colonyij and ComColij are dummies equal to 1 for, respectively,
regions of the same country, countries ever in a colonial relationship and sharing a common











h ¯hzh : (16)
The ¯'s coe±cients in (16) may be consistently estimated from (7). We may then
solve the vector of P1¡¾
j using the system of N goods market equilibrium conditions (16),
estimated coe±cients from (5) and GDP shares. We are thus able to estimate the impact
of the establishment of a political border on trade with former regions of the same country
and with the rest of the world.
IV Empirics
Our empirical strategy consists of three steps. First, we need to estimate the impact of the
components of the trade cost vector using a gravity equation with country ¯xed e®ects.
Second, we solve the vector of P1¡¾
j using the system of N goods market equilibrium
conditions (16). Then we estimate bilateral trade °ows in 2005 and for a counterfactual
world in 2005 with 1945 borders. To be clear about our approach, our aim is not to
compare world trade °ows in 2005 to those in 1945 but world trade °ows in 2005 to those
that would have prevailed, all other things being equal, in 2005 should the political borders
have remained the same as in 1945.
1 Data
Trade °ows are taken from the Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund. GDP data are from the World Bank's World Development
Indicators (WDI). The data on regional trade agreements originates from Vicard (2009)
and data on currency unions are an extended version of Glick and Rose (2002) available
at http://jdesousa.univ.free.fr/data.htm. Data on geographical distances and com-
mon o±cial language come from the CEPII database14. The data on sovereign nations
and colonial relationships are taken from the Correlates of War project15 and completed
by the CIA World Factbook. We consider countries that had a direct colonial link and
14http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/distances.htm
15Correlates of War Project. 2005. \State System Membership List, v2004.1" and \Colonial/Dependency
Contiguity Data, 1816-2002. Version 3.0." http://www.correlatesofwar.org/.
13countries that used to belong to the same country (Czech Republic and Slovakia) as a
single category (Colonyij). We de¯ne a second category for countries sharing a common
colonizer (ComColij).16
2 Same country e®ect
In this section, we take advantage of the discrepancy between sovereign nations and entities
in the DOTS to estimate the impact on bilateral trade of belonging to the same country.
In 2005, the DOTS database reports trade °ows for 20 entities that are not sovereign
states.17
Substituting trade costs (14) into (7) and log-linearizing, we obtain the following econo-
metric model:
lnxij = ¯1 lndistij + ¯2Contigij + ¯3Langij + ¯4Smctryij + ¯5Colonyij + ¯6ComColij
+¯7Comcurij + ¯8RTAij + °1 lnyi + °2Pi | {z }
Ii
+°3 lnyj + °4Pj | {z }
Ei
+"ij (17)
where Ii and Ei are importer's and exporter's ¯xed e®ects and "ij is the error term.
The estimation of (17) by OLS may indeed yield biased estimates: because of Jensen's
inequality (E(ln") 6= lnE(")). Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show that estimating
gravity equations in the standard log-linear form yields biased parameter estimates. They
suggest using a Poisson quasi maximum likelihood (PQML) estimator, which yields con-
sistent estimates in the presence of heteroscedasticity. The PQML technique also enables
us to avoid dropping zero trade values, which represent 31% of observations in our dataset.
We thus estimate (17) in exponential form on a cross-section in 2005 using a PQML esti-
mator.
Results are presented in column (1) of Table 5. The coe±cients on standard gravity
variables are in line with the literature. The coe±cient on the common colonizer dummy
is however not signi¯cant. Since we work on a cross-section in 2005, colonial business
linkages may have vanished since independence (Head et al., 2007). However, when we
include a dummy for countries sharing a common colonizer and still in an ongoing colonial
16These de¯nitions slightly di®er from those adopted in Rose (2000) or Head et al. (2007). For instance,
Mali and C^ ote d'Ivoire were part of French West Africa before their independence. Each of them had
a direct colonial link with France, but they were also part of the same territorial entity. Mali and C^ ote
d'Ivoire are accordingly included in Colonyijinstead of ComColij.
17These entities are small and remote from the rest of the country they belong to. Our results should
accordingly not be regarded as an estimation of the border e®ect put forward by McCallum (1995) and
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) using data on Canadian provinces and US States. They are however
much more representative of the \border e®ect" between colonies and colonizer, since most colonies were
also small and remote from their colonizer.
14relationship, its coe±cient is also insigni¯cant, con¯rming the insigni¯cance of common
colonial history for trade relationships after independence. The inclusion of country ¯xed
e®ects controlling for legal origin may however partially explain this result. Finally, the
insigni¯cant coe±cient on the common currency dummy may re°ect the fact that we
consider the euro together with other common currencies without a long panel dataset
(Frankel, 2008).
Table 5: Gravity results
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent var. M M > 0 log(M)
Estimator Poisson QML OLS
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Observations 29721 20457 20457
R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.73
Notes: a, b, c denotes signi¯cance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
Countries that have ever been in a colonial relationship or part of the same country
since 1945 trade 175% more than other country pairs, while regions currently in a colonial
relationship trade on average e1:01+0:96 ¡ 1 = 616% more.18 Our estimates are conserva-
tive with respect to the literature exploring the impact of colonial history and country
break-up on trade. Rose (2000) shows in his benchmark results for 1990 that the colonial
relationship raises bilateral trade by a factor of 5.75, all other things being equal, while
having had a common colonizer makes countries bilateral trade 80% larger. Papers dealing
directly with the break-up of nations or colonial empires show that country break-up dra-
18The colonial relationship dummy is also set to 1 for countries in an ongoing colonial relationship.
15matically decreases bilateral trade. For instance, Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2003) ¯nd that,
at the time of their independence, the Czech Republic and Slovakia were trading 43 times
more together than with third countries. Five years later, this ratio had been reduced to
7. de Sousa and Lamotte (2007) nevertheless moderate this conclusion with a larger set
of countries including Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Examining the
e®ect of independence on post-colonial trade, Head et al. (2007) conclude that indepen-
dence gradually reduces colonial trade, by damaging business networks or institutions. On
average, trade between a colony and its colonizer is reduced by two-thirds after 30 years
of independence, from an initial level of trade on average 13.5 times larger than trade
between other countries. This discrepancy may come from the fact that we use a PQML
estimator to deal with the fact that the variance of the error term may be correlated with
explaining variables in the log-linearized gravity equation, while other papers implement
OLS.19 Results using OLS con¯rm this explanation (column (3) of Table 5), since the
e®ect of belonging to the same country is found to be ¯ve times larger.20
3 Multilateral resistance terms
In this section, we compute the multilateral resistance terms using the system of goods
market-equilibrium conditions (16) and the trade costs estimated from equation (17).21
Multilateral resistance terms are critical for analyzing the e®ect of new political borders
on trade with third countries. Pi indeed measures the average trade barriers faced by
country i. Since creating a political border between two regions i and j increases bilateral
trade and therefore average trade costs of both countries, it is relatively easier for third
countries to trade with countries i and j.
We have complete data for 181 countries, of which 448 pairs have been part of the
same country or in a colonial relationship since 1945. For each country, computing (16)
requires data on all trade partners, including the country itself. A di±culty here is to
measure internal distance (Head and Mayer, 2002; Redding and Venables, 2004). We use
3 di®erent measures of internal distance. First, we consider intra-national distance as the
distance to the nearest neighbor divided by four (Wei, 1996; Anderson and van Wincoop,
2003). Second, we compute distance as distii = 0:67
p
area=¦, which measures the average
distance between producers and consumers in a country considered as a circle. Finally,
we compute distances based on bilateral distances between the largest cities weighted by
19Note that the di®erence in the de¯nition of the dummy for current and past colonial relationships does
not drive this result.
20The selection bias due to the exclusion of zero trade °ows when using OLS is not signi¯cant (column
(2) of Table 5).
21Computationally, we solve (16) for P
1¡¾
i so that we do not need estimates of elasticity of substitution
¾.
16their population (Head and Mayer, 2002).22 The measurement of internal and interna-
tional distances is consistent with this weighted measure of distance. The common border,
common language, and the same country and colonial relationship dummies are also set
to unity for intranational trade costs. We compute trade costs from (14) for the year 2005
and for our counterfactual world for each of the internal distance measures.23
The level of multilateral resistance P¾¡1 is, as expected, lower for large countries such
as the United States and Japan, and countries surrounded by other rich countries, such as
EU countries (see appendix) or small and rich countries with large neighbors (Singapore,
Hong-Kong). Conversely, small countries and remote islands face the largest multilateral
resistances. The level of P¾¡1 depends on the measure of internal distance used. Wei
(1996)'s measure of internal distance places more weight on domestic GDP and reduces
P¾¡1 for rich countries and increases it for poor countries. The opposite is true for the
measure of internal distance based on domestic area. Weighted distance increases P¾¡1
for all countries with respect to Wei (1996)'s measure, but more for small and remote
countries. The ranking of P¾¡1 however changes only at the margin. Large countries, like
the United States, have relatively larger internal distance with area based and weighted
distance measures than with Wei (1996)'s measure, and have a relatively larger multilateral
resistance compared to smaller countries like Japan.
The e®ect of our counterfactual exercise on multilateral resistance depends on the kind
of countries considered (see appendix). Switching to 1945 borders decreases multilateral
resistance in former colonies and former regions of a large country. The decrease is large
for countries close to their former colonizer (Papua New Guinea, Namibia) or the former
regions of the same country (former members of the USSR). Conversely, OECD countries
exhibit no change in P¾¡1. France and the UK are exceptions since they experience a
small decrease in their multilateral resistance, due to the removal of border barriers with
their former colonies. Since former colonies are small and remote, removing border barriers
with them has a limited impact on French and English average trade costs. Russia also
exhibits an increase in its multilateral resistance. These results are basically similar for
all three measures of internal distance.




l2j(popl=popj)distkl where popk is the population
of agglomeration k belonging to country i and distkl is the geodesic distance between agglomeration k and
l.
23When weighted distance is used to measure internal distance, we also re-estimate (17) using weighted
international distance and use the estimated coe±cients on trade costs. Results are presented in Table 7
in Appendix A.
174 Estimation of world trade
In this ¯nal section, we estimate trade °ows for our sample of 181 countries in 2005 and







¡ 0:79lndistij + 0:54Contigij + 0:17Langij + 0:96Smctryh
ij + 1:01Colonyh
ij
+0:27RTAij + 0:36WTOij + (¾ ¡ 1)ln ~ Ph
i + (¾ ¡ 1)ln ~ Ph
j ; h = fa;cg (18)
where h = a stands for the actual world in 2005 and h = c for our counterfactual world.
~ xh
ij is the predicted trade °ow from i to j and Smctryh
ij and Colonyh
ij are respectively
regions of the same country and countries ever in a colonial relationship since World War
II in each state of the world. ~ Pt
i have been computed in the preceding section.
Results using each of the three measures of internal distance are presented in table
6. The results are qualitatively similar for all three measures of internal distance. We
thus focus our discussion on the simplest measure, the Wei (1996) measure of internal
distance. Predicted trade °ows in 2005 exhibit a fairly good ¯t; when compared to the
25675 observations for which we actually have trade data, the R-squared is 0.64.25
Changing political borders a®ects both the volume and the geography of trade °ows.
Our results show that international trade, i.e. °ows crossing a border, is 9% larger in
2005 than what it would have been with 1945 borders. The increase in the number of
independent countries since WWII has led to a sizeable increase in measured international
trade.
The picture is however di®erent when we consider all trade °ows, i.e. trade °ows
between the 181 countries for which data are available, irrespective of whether they cross
a border or not. In 2005, all these countries are independent, so that all their trade °ows
are recorded as international trade. In our counterfactual world, 13% of trade takes place
between regions of the same country or a colonizer and its colonies, and is not recorded as
international trade. When all trade °ows are considered, total trade in 2005 is 4% lower
than what it would have been with 1945 borders. Increasing the number of independent
countries therefore increases the measured international trade by increasing the number of
°ows recorded as international trade, but it reduces the volume of these °ows by creating
new border barriers.
As regards the geography of world trade, trade between former regions of the same
country and between colonizers and their colonies in 2005 is half its value in our counterfac-
24German reuni¯cation is not taken into account here since Germany was divided into the Federal
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic in 1949.
25We calculate R-squared as the squared correlation between the observed and the predicted bilateral
exports.
18tual world. The presence of new border barriers between these countries also a®ects their
exchanges with the rest of the world because it increases their average trade barriers. In
the aggregate, former regions of the same country and colonizers and their colonies trade
1.9% more with third countries. A country's break-up therefore a®ects third countries'
trade.
Finally, trade between OECD countries is only marginally a®ected by new political
borders. France and the UK are exceptions since their bilateral trade is estimated to
have increased by 2% thanks to the decolonization process. In the aggregate, French
and English trade with the rest of OECD countries is 1% larger in 2005 than in our
counterfactual world.
Table 6: Estimations of world trade in 2005 and in the counterfactual world
Internal distance measure
Wei Area Weighted
International trade (counterfactual/2005) 0,918 0,928 0,917
Total trade (counterfactual/2005) 1,040 1,017 1,041
Non colonial trade (counterfactual/2005) 0,981 0,977 0,981
Colonial trade (counterfactual/2005) 1,893 1,769 1,895
Colonial trade*/international trade (counterfactual) 0,132 0,096 0,136
Colonial trade/international trade (2005) 0,064 0,050 0,066
Mean x 3,81E+08 3,81E+08 3,81E+08
Mean estimated x (2005) 2,16E+08 4,90E+08 3,97E+08
R-squared 0,64 0,64 0,63
Notes: Computed from speci¯cation (1) in Table 5 for the Wei and area distance measures,
and from speci¯cation (1) in Table 7 for the weighted distance measure.
*Trade between colonizers and their colonies and regions of the same country.
V Conclusion
This paper investigates how the process of political break-up since World War II - the
number of sovereign states has risen from 72 in 1948 to 192 today -, directly a®ects the
volume and the geography of international trade. We ¯rst show that variation over time
in the number of trade origins/partners recorded in international trade statistics create
an accounting artefact in the measurement of world trade growth. Trade °ows between
regions of the same country in 1948 were indeed not recorded and, in the case of several
colonies and countries, trade was simply not recorded in 1948. These discrepancies in the
sample of countries included in the DOTS accounts for 17% of the growth in international
trade between 1948 and 2007.
19Second, we lay out an empirical strategy to investigate the impact of country break-
ups on world trade based on a structural estimation of a gravity model of trade µ a la
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). We ¯nd that the rise in the number of independent
countries since WWII has increased international trade by 9%, by raising the number
of °ows recorded as international trade, i.e. °ows crossing a political border. It has
however reduced total trade by 4%, i.e. including trade between former regions of the
same country and former colonizers and their colonies, because new political borders create
border barriers. Our results emphasize that the extensive margin of world trade related
to the recognition of new sovereign states has a sizeable impact on the measurement of
world trade growth since WWII. Our paper thus complements the results of Baier and
Bergstrand (2001) on the determinants of the intensive margin of the growth in world
trade.
This paper shows that the distribution of world GDP across sovereign political entities
and their number matter for the measurement of trade openness. It suggests to be cautious
when measuring trade globalization only by the trend in the trade to GDP ratio, without
taking into account the number of potential trading partners in the world.
20Appendix A
Table 7: Gravity results: weighted distance
(1) (2) (3)
X X > 0 log X
Estimator Poisson QML OLS
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Observations 29368 20289 20289
R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.73
Notes: a, b, c denotes signi¯cance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
21Appendix B
Table 8: Multilateral resistance terms P¾¡1 in 2005 and in the
counterfactual world (CF)
Internal Distance Wei Area Weighted
Country CF 2005 2005/CF CF 2005 2005/CF CF 2005 2005/CF
Belarus 19.6 26.7 1.36 15.3 24.3 1.59 26.7 36.8 1.38
Tajikistan 50.0 64.5 1.29 39.8 52.4 1.31 71.4 93.5 1.31
Kyrgyz Republic 39.8 51.0 1.28 31.0 40.2 1.30 56.8 73.5 1.29
Moldova 27.3 34.7 1.27 21.3 27.9 1.31 37.2 47.6 1.28
Georgia 27.9 35.3 1.27 22.1 30.8 1.39 38.9 48.8 1.25
Latvia 18.9 23.1 1.22 15.5 20.8 1.34 25.4 30.9 1.21
Namibia 49.0 59.9 1.22 36.5 51.3 1.41 75.2 89.3 1.19
Ukraine 19.2 23.5 1.22 16.7 24.8 1.48 26.7 32.8 1.23
Papua New Guinea 55.6 67.1 1.21 45.2 61.3 1.36 78.7 95.2 1.21
Azerbaijan 30.6 36.9 1.21 26.4 36.4 1.38 42.6 51.0 1.20
Marshall Islands 82.0 98.0 1.20 60.2 87.0 1.44 113.6 129.9 1.14
Estonia 19.7 23.5 1.19 15.9 20.8 1.31 26.2 31.1 1.18
Kazakhstan 32.3 38.5 1.19 28.5 39.8 1.40 47.2 56.2 1.19
Turkmenistan 46.9 55.9 1.19 40.5 50.5 1.25 68.0 80.6 1.19
Lithuania 16.9 20.1 1.19 14.7 19.4 1.32 22.5 26.7 1.18
Micronesia. Fed. Sts. 82.6 98.0 1.19 61.0 85.5 1.40 116.3 133.3 1.15
Palau 87.0 103.1 1.19 61.3 84.0 1.37 125.0 142.9 1.14
Uzbekistan 41.2 48.8 1.19 38.8 49.5 1.28 58.5 69.4 1.19
Armenia 30.7 36.2 1.18 26.7 33.4 1.25 41.5 49.0 1.18
Eritrea 73.0 85.5 1.17 56.8 67.1 1.18 108.7 128.2 1.18
Mauritania 65.8 74.1 1.13 48.1 55.6 1.16 100.0 112.4 1.12
Central African Republic 68.5 76.9 1.12 50.5 57.8 1.14 105.3 117.6 1.12
Niger 57.1 64.1 1.12 43.5 50.5 1.16 86.2 96.2 1.12
Bosnia and Herzegovina 32.1 35.7 1.11 31.4 36.0 1.14 43.3 48.5 1.12
Tunisia 21.3 23.7 1.11 19.7 23.8 1.21 28.7 31.8 1.11
Mali 56.5 62.5 1.11 45.5 52.6 1.16 84.7 93.5 1.10
Gambia. The 63.3 69.9 1.10 47.6 54.3 1.14 91.7 101.0 1.10
Sierra Leone 63.7 69.9 1.10 49.5 56.5 1.14 93.5 102.0 1.09
Chad 54.3 59.5 1.10 44.1 50.5 1.15 80.6 88.5 1.10
Djibouti 61.7 67.6 1.09 47.8 54.1 1.13 89.3 97.1 1.09
Algeria 26.2 28.7 1.09 26.4 31.6 1.20 37.3 41.0 1.10
Morocco 22.2 24.3 1.09 21.9 26.0 1.19 30.6 33.4 1.09
Guinea 55.9 61.0 1.09 46.1 52.6 1.14 81.3 88.5 1.09
Vanuatu 117.6 128.2 1.09 94.3 108.7 1.15 175.4 188.7 1.08
Sudan 48.3 52.6 1.09 48.3 55.6 1.15 71.4 77.5 1.09
Togo 53.8 58.5 1.09 46.1 52.4 1.14 76.9 82.6 1.07
Burkina Faso 49.5 53.8 1.09 43.5 49.8 1.14 71.4 76.9 1.08
Libya 34.1 36.9 1.08 35.2 41.8 1.19 48.8 52.6 1.08
Guyana 64.9 69.9 1.08 45.5 49.5 1.09 98.0 105.3 1.07
Benin 46.9 50.3 1.07 41.8 46.7 1.12 66.7 70.9 1.06
Dominica 57.8 61.7 1.07 45.5 49.8 1.09 78.7 82.6 1.05
Comoros 87.7 93.5 1.07 80.0 87.7 1.10 122.0 126.6 1.04
Senegal 43.3 46.1 1.06 42.7 48.5 1.14 60.6 64.1 1.06
Madagascar 66.2 70.4 1.06 61.0 67.6 1.11 97.1 102.0 1.05
Croatia 16.8 17.9 1.06 18.1 19.5 1.08 21.9 23.3 1.06
Gabon 46.5 49.3 1.06 45.9 50.8 1.11 65.8 69.4 1.06
Kiribati 137.0 144.9 1.06 106.4 114.9 1.08 204.1 212.8 1.04
Zimbabwe 60.6 64.1 1.06 50.3 54.1 1.08 88.5 92.6 1.05
Macedonia. FYR 28.5 30.0 1.05 25.4 26.7 1.05 38.0 40.0 1.05
Solomon Islands 102.0 107.5 1.05 75.2 81.3 1.08 153.8 161.3 1.05
Serbia 28.0 29.5 1.05 30.8 32.8 1.07 38.2 40.2 1.05
Belize 54.6 57.5 1.05 41.7 44.6 1.07 76.9 80.6 1.05
St. Kitts and Nevis 48.8 51.3 1.05 43.1 46.7 1.08 62.5 64.9 1.04
Lesotho 61.0 64.1 1.05 50.5 54.3 1.08 87.0 90.9 1.05
Malawi 60.6 63.7 1.05 54.3 59.2 1.09 86.2 90.1 1.05
Malta 17.3 18.2 1.05 19.5 21.8 1.12 20.7 21.6 1.04
Jordan 29.2 30.7 1.05 27.5 29.9 1.09 39.8 41.5 1.04
C^ ote d'Ivoire 38.9 40.8 1.05 41.7 46.1 1.11 54.3 56.8 1.05
Cameroon 38.5 40.3 1.05 38.6 42.2 1.09 54.3 56.8 1.05
St. Vincent 51.0 53.5 1.05 44.4 48.3 1.09 66.2 68.5 1.03
Ghana 41.7 43.7 1.05 41.5 45.2 1.09 58.1 60.6 1.04
Zambia 57.1 59.9 1.05 52.6 57.1 1.09 82.6 86.2 1.04
Grenada 48.5 50.8 1.05 43.7 47.4 1.09 62.1 64.1 1.03
Antigua and Barbuda 42.6 44.4 1.04 41.2 44.4 1.08 53.8 55.2 1.03
Slovenia 15.0 15.6 1.04 16.3 17.3 1.06 19.2 20.0 1.05
continued on next page
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Country CF 2005 2005/CF CF 2005 2005/CF CF 2005 2005/CF
Slovak Republic 13.4 14.0 1.04 14.9 16.0 1.07 17.1 17.8 1.04
Uganda 46.1 48.1 1.04 46.1 50.0 1.09 64.5 67.1 1.04
Bhutan 80.6 84.0 1.04 61.3 64.9 1.06 123.5 128.2 1.04
St. Lucia 44.4 46.3 1.04 42.4 45.9 1.08 56.5 58.5 1.04
Tanzania 47.2 49.0 1.04 46.5 50.0 1.08 67.6 69.9 1.03
Seychelles 61.7 64.1 1.04 68.0 72.5 1.07 78.7 80.6 1.02
Philippines 19.0 19.7 1.04 24.3 27.4 1.13 25.7 26.5 1.03
Lao PDR 71.9 74.6 1.04 58.5 61.7 1.06 106.4 109.9 1.03
Lebanon 22.9 23.8 1.04 27.9 30.1 1.08 29.7 30.5 1.03
Swaziland 47.4 49.0 1.03 43.7 46.3 1.06 64.5 66.2 1.03
Tonga 109.9 113.6 1.03 105.3 111.1 1.06 149.3 151.5 1.02
Kenya 41.2 42.6 1.03 44.4 47.8 1.08 57.8 59.5 1.03
Cyprus 20.2 20.9 1.03 23.4 25.1 1.08 25.8 26.5 1.03
Russian Federation 13.5 13.9 1.03 24.8 26.1 1.05 19.3 20.0 1.03
Guinea-Bissau 80.6 83.3 1.03 59.5 61.7 1.04 122.0 126.6 1.04
Botswana 46.1 47.6 1.03 42.7 45.5 1.06 64.5 66.2 1.03
Syrian Arab Republic 26.7 27.5 1.03 34.1 37.0 1.09 35.8 36.9 1.03
Equatorial Guinea 45.5 46.9 1.03 53.2 56.5 1.06 61.3 62.9 1.03
Yemen. Rep. 51.5 53.2 1.03 55.6 58.8 1.06 74.1 75.8 1.02
Cambodia 50.0 51.5 1.03 47.4 50.3 1.06 69.9 71.4 1.02
Maldives 46.5 47.8 1.03 50.5 53.5 1.06 57.5 58.5 1.02
Jamaica 28.9 29.6 1.02 33.8 35.6 1.05 37.0 37.6 1.02
Congo. Rep. 22.9 23.4 1.02 43.1 47.4 1.10 27.4 27.8 1.01
Oman 28.2 28.9 1.02 32.8 34.2 1.04 38.5 39.1 1.02
Bangladesh 20.5 21.0 1.02 26.8 28.2 1.05 27.3 27.9 1.02
Pakistan 20.4 20.9 1.02 24.4 25.6 1.05 28.2 28.8 1.02
Fiji 55.9 57.1 1.02 62.9 66.2 1.05 73.5 74.6 1.01
Barbados 27.8 28.4 1.02 33.8 35.6 1.05 33.2 33.8 1.02
Nigeria 21.8 22.3 1.02 28.7 30.2 1.05 30.2 30.8 1.02
Samoa 108.7 111.1 1.02 105.3 109.9 1.04 147.1 149.3 1.01
Suriname 70.9 72.5 1.02 56.8 58.8 1.04 103.1 105.3 1.02
Trinidad and Tobago 21.5 21.8 1.02 28.2 29.3 1.04 26.7 27.0 1.01
Mauritius 28.1 28.6 1.02 37.9 39.4 1.04 34.4 34.7 1.01
Israel 10.1 10.3 1.02 14.4 14.9 1.04 12.8 12.9 1.01
Cape Verde 74.1 75.2 1.02 74.1 75.8 1.02 100.0 101.0 1.01
Czech Republic 11.6 11.7 1.01 13.6 13.9 1.02 15.0 15.2 1.01
Sri Lanka 27.6 28.0 1.01 35.8 37.0 1.03 36.4 36.8 1.01
Timor-Leste 129.9 131.6 1.01 108.7 109.9 1.01 192.3 192.3 1.00
Vietnam 31.3 31.7 1.01 41.2 42.4 1.03 43.5 43.9 1.01
Qatar 15.2 15.4 1.01 20.6 21.1 1.03 19.0 19.2 1.01
Brunei Darussalam 27.8 28.1 1.01 36.8 37.9 1.03 34.6 35.0 1.01
Rwanda 54.9 55.6 1.01 54.3 54.6 1.01 75.2 75.8 1.01
United Kingdom 4.2 4.2 1.01 6.5 6.7 1.02 5.5 5.6 1.01
Sao Tome and Principe 108.7 109.9 1.01 87.7 88.5 1.01 156.3 158.7 1.02
Bahrain 14.4 14.6 1.01 20.2 20.7 1.03 16.9 17.1 1.01
Kuwait 12.3 12.4 1.01 17.7 18.1 1.03 15.5 15.6 1.01
United Arab Emirates 13.4 13.6 1.01 19.3 19.8 1.02 17.5 17.6 1.01
Egypt. Arab Rep. 22.8 23.0 1.01 27.5 27.7 1.01 31.5 31.8 1.01
France 4.8 4.9 1.01 7.4 7.5 1.01 6.5 6.5 1.01
Angola 41.5 41.8 1.01 49.8 50.3 1.01 58.5 58.8 1.01
India 11.4 11.5 1.01 17.1 17.5 1.02 16.1 16.2 1.01
Burundi 74.1 74.6 1.01 62.5 63.3 1.01 105.3 106.4 1.01
Malaysia 17.2 17.3 1.01 24.7 25.1 1.02 23.1 23.3 1.00
Mongolia 67.1 67.6 1.01 47.4 47.4 1.00 102.0 102.0 1.00
Mozambique 51.0 51.3 1.01 54.9 55.2 1.01 70.4 70.4 1.00
South Africa 14.4 14.5 1.00 26.2 26.2 1.00 19.4 19.5 1.00
Hong Kong. China 5.3 5.3 1.00 8.6 8.6 1.01 6.1 6.1 1.00
Singapore 5.8 5.8 1.00 9.3 9.4 1.01 6.6 6.6 1.00
Congo. Dem. Rep. 21.9 22.0 1.00 51.8 51.8 1.00 26.0 26.0 1.00
Indonesia 17.5 17.5 1.00 26.5 26.6 1.01 24.3 24.3 1.00
Macao. China 9.5 9.5 1.00 14.7 14.7 1.00 10.2 10.2 1.00
Netherlands 5.4 5.4 1.00 8.1 8.1 1.00 6.9 6.9 1.00
Italy 5.0 5.0 1.00 7.9 7.9 1.00 6.6 6.6 1.00
United States 3.2 3.2 1.00 6.5 6.5 1.00 4.5 4.5 1.00
Argentina 15.3 15.3 1.00 31.9 31.9 1.00 20.5 20.5 1.00
Australia 15.5 15.5 1.00 24.9 24.9 1.00 22.2 22.2 1.00
Chile 21.8 21.8 1.00 31.0 30.9 1.00 29.9 29.9 1.00
China 8.3 8.3 1.00 14.3 14.2 1.00 11.8 11.8 1.00
Costa Rica 29.0 29.0 1.00 37.2 37.2 1.00 37.7 37.7 1.00
Dominican Republic 24.5 24.5 1.00 32.7 32.6 1.00 31.7 31.7 1.00
Haiti 45.7 45.7 1.00 46.3 45.9 0.99 60.6 60.6 1.00
Japan 3.4 3.4 1.00 5.8 5.8 1.00 4.5 4.5 1.00
Korea. Rep. 6.1 6.1 1.00 9.9 9.9 1.00 7.9 7.9 1.00
Nicaragua 51.8 51.8 1.00 48.3 48.1 1.00 71.4 71.4 1.00
continued on next page
23Internal Distance Wei Area Weighted
Country CF 2005 2005/CF CF 2005 2005/CF CF 2005 2005/CF
New Zealand 19.6 19.6 1.00 30.5 30.4 1.00 26.0 26.0 1.00
Peru 28.1 28.1 1.00 37.2 37.0 1.00 39.1 39.1 1.00
Portugal 11.4 11.4 1.00 16.2 16.2 1.00 14.9 14.9 1.00
Paraguay 54.3 54.3 1.00 50.8 50.5 0.99 76.9 76.3 0.99
Uruguay 36.5 36.5 1.00 38.8 38.6 1.00 49.0 49.0 1.00
Germany 4.1 4.1 1.00 6.5 6.4 1.00 5.5 5.5 1.00
Spain 6.8 6.8 1.00 10.6 10.6 1.00 9.2 9.2 1.00
Switzerland 6.8 6.8 1.00 9.6 9.5 1.00 8.7 8.7 1.00
Canada 9.5 9.5 1.00 13.7 13.6 1.00 13.3 13.3 1.00
Greece 10.1 10.0 1.00 14.8 14.7 1.00 13.2 13.2 1.00
Ireland 10.2 10.2 1.00 14.0 13.9 0.99 13.2 13.2 1.00
Mexico 10.8 10.8 1.00 16.3 16.2 1.00 15.0 15.0 1.00
Sweden 11.0 11.0 1.00 15.3 15.3 1.00 14.8 14.8 1.00
Norway 11.2 11.2 1.00 15.6 15.5 0.99 15.0 15.0 1.00
Belgium 6.4 6.4 1.00 8.7 8.6 1.00 8.2 8.2 1.00
Austria 6.8 6.8 1.00 11.4 11.3 0.99 8.7 8.6 1.00
Brazil 13.7 13.6 1.00 21.4 21.4 1.00 19.6 19.6 1.00
Saudi Arabia 15.0 14.9 1.00 23.8 23.6 0.99 20.7 20.6 1.00
Denmark 8.2 8.2 1.00 11.5 11.5 1.00 10.5 10.4 1.00
Thailand 16.9 16.9 1.00 25.1 25.0 1.00 22.8 22.8 1.00
Finland 9.7 9.7 1.00 17.9 17.7 0.99 12.5 12.4 1.00
Venezuela. RB 20.1 20.1 1.00 28.0 27.9 1.00 27.6 27.6 1.00
Luxembourg 10.8 10.7 1.00 12.4 12.3 0.99 13.4 13.4 1.00
Poland 10.8 10.8 1.00 14.5 14.3 0.99 14.4 14.4 1.00
Turkey 11.0 10.9 1.00 16.1 16.0 1.00 14.9 14.9 1.00
Colombia 22.4 22.4 1.00 30.3 30.2 1.00 31.0 31.0 1.00
El Salvador 26.3 26.2 1.00 33.9 33.9 1.00 33.4 33.4 1.00
Hungary 13.4 13.4 1.00 16.9 16.7 0.99 17.5 17.5 1.00
Guatemala 28.0 27.9 1.00 34.5 34.4 1.00 37.0 37.0 1.00
Ecuador 29.4 29.3 1.00 37.3 37.2 1.00 39.5 39.5 1.00
Albania 31.0 30.9 1.00 31.1 30.7 0.99 41.2 40.8 0.99
Iceland 32.4 32.3 1.00 35.3 35.1 0.99 43.7 43.5 1.00
Romania 16.9 16.9 1.00 21.2 21.0 0.99 22.7 22.6 1.00
Panama 34.2 34.1 1.00 41.5 41.3 1.00 45.5 45.5 1.00
Honduras 41.8 41.7 1.00 44.6 44.4 1.00 56.2 56.2 1.00
Bulgaria 23.5 23.4 1.00 24.6 24.4 0.99 31.4 31.3 1.00
Iran. Islamic Rep. 23.5 23.4 1.00 33.1 32.9 0.99 33.3 33.2 1.00
Bolivia 56.2 55.9 0.99 51.5 51.3 0.99 80.6 80.6 1.00
Ethiopia 66.7 66.2 0.99 70.4 69.4 0.99 97.1 97.1 1.00
Nepal 43.1 42.7 0.99 41.8 41.3 0.99 59.5 59.2 0.99
Liberia 114.9 113.6 0.99 88.5 86.2 0.97 178.6 175.4 0.98
Afghanistan 66.7 65.8 0.99 59.9 58.8 0.98 98.0 97.1 0.99
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